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Circular Economy, Title, and 
Harmonisation of Commercial Law  
This chapter considers the implications of law and circular economy on commercial law 
harmonisation, in light of the necessarily cross-jurisdictional nature of circular economies 
and the recognised role for English law in global harmonisation debates. Some of the more 
profound effects will be considered herein, most importantly the shift from “ownership” to 
“use” of goods as a guiding principle required by circular economic thought. This shift will 
have various effects on commercial law, but can fit with English law. The foundation of this 
analysis will thus be an illustration of the shift to governance of circular economic practices 
through contract rather than title, as better able to control use of goods. The implications for 
harmonisation as a mechanism for ensuring circular economy will also be considered. It will 
be suggested that general harmonisation is most unlikely, but aspects of commercial law may 
be harmonised through various means in order to effectively implement the contractual focus 
of circular economy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Leoni Levi produced a compendium of the 
commercial laws of a vast array of jurisdictions, prefaced with a salutary reminder of the 
importance of cross-jurisdictional observation and analysis:  
 
In an epoch when commercial relations embrace the greatest public and private 
interest, when nationalities are all but blended into each other, when work, 
improvement, and welfare, are the all-prevailing ideas; and, when the rapidity of 
communication demands in a corresponding degree security and protection; the 
revision of the laws, statutes, usages, and customs of all countries becomes 
imperative. As nations are approaching each other, each is enabled to profit by the 
common experience; and it is of the utmost importance to watch carefully all 
innovations, and mark the reason and the starting point of all essential and permanent 
progress.1 
 
Here, the aim is somewhat different, but the basic rationale remains the same: examine 
commercial law and practice in an era of changes to law, of technological change, and of 
developments in jurisprudential relationships. This chapter considers the effect of circular 
economy on law, and vice-versa. The next section outlines circular economic thought, and 
identifies the need to focus on aspects of ownership and control regarding goods. Section 
three will set out a specific problematic issue of English law in light of a need to shift from 
ownership to use in circular economies. This issue concerns the interrelationship between 
contract and property as control mechanisms for down-stream parties in a chain of 
transactions. Following this will be examination of harmonisation of commercial law. The 
problems faced by circular economies in terms of obtaining necessary levels of legal 
harmonisation will be identified. Two possible directions for harmonisation will be 
                                                 
1 L Levi, Commercial Law, Its Principles and Administration; or, the Mercantile Law of Great Britain (William 
Benning & Co, London 1850) vol 1, vii. See further G. R. Rubin, ‘Levi, Leone (1821–1888)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16551]. All URLs accessed 01 September 2017. 
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considered: (1) application of property control mechanisms; and (2) application of contractual 
control mechanisms. The likely success of the latter direction will not result in the direct 
harmonisation of a circular economy law or laws, but this will not preclude a profusion of 
contractual control mechanisms to enable effective implementation of circular economic 
practices. Section five concludes. 
2. CIRCULAR ECONOMY 
The notion of a circular economy is a relatively recent development, though it has academic 
antecedents across a broad range of disciplines.2 It has come to fruition in recent years by 
means of NGO and think-tank analyses,3 before being taken up by domestic, regional and 
international governmental and institutional organs. These efforts have also found 
considerable support from corporate interests, both directly,4 and via interest and lobby 
groups,5 as well as via charitable organisations.6 Additionally, there is governmental support 
(in the UK) in the form of recent funding calls offering to support the study of the circular 
                                                 
2 See e.g. W R Stahel, ‘The Product-Life Factor’ (1982) (at http://www.product-life.org/en/major-
publications/the-product-life-factor); W R Stahel and G Reday-Mulvey, Jobs for Tomorrow: The Potential for 
Substituting Manpower for Energy (New York: Vantage Press 1981) (examining the notions of closing loops in 
systems); R Frosch and N Gallopoulos, ‘Strategies for Manufacturing’ (1989) 261(3) Scientific American 94-
102 (analogy between industrial and biological ecosystems);  M Fischer-Kowalski and W Hüttler, ‘Society’s 
metabolism: The intellectual history of materials flow analysis, part II: 1970-1998’ (1998) 2(4) Journal of 
Industrial Ecology 107-136 (the impact of socio-economics); W McDonough and M Braungart, Cradle to 
cradle: remaking the way we make things (New York: North Point Press 2002) (arguing that the 3Rs approach 
(reduce, reuse, recycle) is too wasteful, and a more intensive cycling of products is necessary).  As to the 
importance of public (mis)perception, whilst 59% of respondents in a client survey though recycling helps the 
transition to a circular economy the most, the role of recycling is much more limited in a circular economy: G 
Hieminga, Rethinking finance in a circular economy: Financial implications of circular business models (May 
2015) (at http://www.ing.com/About-us/Ourstories/Features/Circular-economy-challenges-financial-business-
models.htm) 12. At the “Creativity within the Circular Economy” symposium, The Westminster Law and 
Theory Lab, University of Westminster, 24 March 2016, Jules Hayward of the Ellen MacArthur Foundation 
noted that the current approach to circular economic thought is a synthesis of existing work concerning the 
performance economy (Stahel), cradle to cradle (McDonough), natural capitalism (P Hawkin, A Lovins and L H 
Lovins, Natural Capitalism: Creating the next industrial revolution (Little, Brown and Co, 1999)), industrial 
ecology and symbiosis (MR Chertow, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: Literature and Taxonomy’ (2000) 25 Annual 
Review of Energy and the Environment 313), and biomimicry (https://biomimicry.org/). See generally 
http://www.circulareconomy.com/circular-economy/schools-of-thought/.  
3 F Preston, ‘A Global Redesign? Shaping the Circular Economy’ (Chatham House Briefing Paper, 1 March 
2012), at https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182376; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 
Towards the Circular Economy: Economic and business rationale for an accelerated transition (2013) 
http://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/assets/downloads/publications/Ellen-MacArthur-Foundation-
Towards-the-Circular-Economy-vol.1.pdf. See also e.g. http://www.product-life.org/ (the Product-Life Institute 
was founded by Stahel, amongst others). 
4 See e.g. http://www.coara.co.uk/definitive-guide-circular-economy-businesses/ (a commercial asset recycling 
business); http://www.veolia.co.uk/circulareconomy (a waste management business); Hieminga, above n 2 
(bank).    
5 For example, the management consultants McKinsey provide substantial research for the Ellen MacArthur 
Foundation’s work on circular economy, and the Ellen MacArthur Foundation is heavily supported by corporate 
interests: https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/about/partners. See also e.g. Chartered Institute of Wastes 
Management, The Circular Economy: what does it mean for the waste and resource management sector? 
(October 2014) http://www.ciwm-journal.co.uk/downloads/CIWM_Circular_Economy_Report-
FULL_FINAL_Oct_2014.pdf.  
6 http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/about-us. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/bike-
blog/2016/oct/21/islabikes-radical-new-plan-means-you-may-never-need-to-buy-your-child-a-bike-again. 
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economy,7 as well as more direct governmental agencies engaging in the issue.8 These efforts 
often complement and refer to each other.9 Academic interest has also accelerated.10 What, 
therefore, is the circular economy? 
A circular economy is often presented quite simply, as a form of interconnected (hence 
circular) sectors of economic practices, which enable minimization of waste products leaking 
out by various means at the different stages of the creation-consumption process. Different 
formulations can be gleaned from the different sources cited throughout this paper: what 
appears common is the basic notion of maximising value and minimising waste by means of 
better design at the outset and reuse/recycling at the end. The charitable organisation WRAP 
puts it this way: ‘A circular economy is an alternative to a traditional linear economy (make, 
use, dispose) in which we keep resources in use for as long as possible, extract the maximum 
value from them whilst in use, then recover and regenerate products and materials at the end 
of each service life.’11  
It is important though to recognise that waste is just one aspect of circular economy. At 
the Creativity within the Circular Economy symposium,12 Hayward suggested there were 
three principles at the heart of circular economic thought: (1) preservation and enhancement 
of natural capital; (2) optimisation of resource yields; and (3) fostering system effectiveness 
by revealing and designing out negative externalities. Put another way: circular economy is 
concerned not just with waste, but with designing and utilising mechanisms and systems for 
the long-term use of material objects.13 Circular economy thus requires analysis of the 
transference mechanisms by which goods transition to different sectors of the circular 
economy.  
Despite the necessarily holistic nature of circular economies, the centrality of waste and 
waste management, connected to claims as to environmental benefits, has resulted in 
regulatory regimes being structured around waste.14 One of the earliest instances of the 
regulatory turn can be found in the Circular Economy Promotion Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, which was promulgated in August 2008 and came into force in January 
                                                 
7 https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/funding/calls/circulareconomy/. The EPSRC also provides a position statement which 
provides a useful overview of the circular economy concept: 
https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/files/funding/calls/2015/circulareconomypositionstatement/. 
8 See e.g. Collaboration for a Circular Economy, Innovate UK at 
https://connect.innovateuk.org/web/collaborations-circular-economy/overview; Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, UK response to European Commission consultation of member states on the circular 
economy (11 November 2015) (at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-economy-and-waste-
markets-uk-government-response-to-european-commission-consultations). 
9 See e.g. DEFRA, above n 8, 8 (referring to the Ellen MacArthur Foundation and Hieminga’s report for ING 
(above n 2). 
10 See e.g. Call for Papers for a special issue of the Journal of Industrial Ecology on ‘Exploring the Circular 
Economy’: http://jie.yale.edu/jie-cfp-circular_econ; https://www.ukela.org/circular-economy (special interest 
group of the UK Environmental Law Association); http://www.greatrecovery.org.uk/resources/what-is-the-
great-recovery/ (‘The Great Recovery is a project run by the RSA and supported by Innovate UK. It looks at the 
challenges of waste and the opportunities of a circular economy through the lens of design.’) 
11 Cf http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/wrap-and-circular-economy. 
12 Above n 2. 
13 This explanation should clearly demonstrate why this chapter’s focus is on material objects: intangible things, 
such as digital products, are not subject to the same sort of deterioration resulting from usage and can potentially 
exist forever (not least because, under the current technological framework, digital products are invariably 
duplicated when transmitted, and at worst are duplicable without any significant cost). Nevertheless they do 
need to be considered, as in e.g. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Intelligent Assets: Unlocking the circular 
economy potential (8 February 2016), available at http://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications.  
14 The centrality of waste to circular economic thought is likely to be part of a rhetorical tactic in order to 
enhance the ethical standing of circular economic analysis and related work: N Gregson, M Crang, S Fuller & H 
Holmes, ‘Interrogating the circular economy: the moral economy of resources recovery in the EU’ (2015) 44 
Economy and Society 218. 
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2009.15 It defined a ‘circular economy’ as ‘a generic term for the reducing, reusing and 
recycling activities conducted in the process of production, circulation and consumption.’16 
This will ‘be propelled by the government, led by the market, effected by enterprises and 
participated in by the public.’17 In this sense, the Chinese first-step has been copied broadly 
by later adopters, for whom the role of government is key. This is illustrated in the preference 
for circular business practices in public procurement,18 which would be mirrored by the UK 
government some six years later (noted below). The PRC also set out provisions that impose 
obligations to recycle certain named products onto producers, who are covered even if the 
material is ‘deserted’ (abandoned).19 The heavy focus on waste (the nature, role and 
processing of waste) in the PRC’s law would come to be replicated within the EU’s own later 
circular economy strategy.20 The EU’s aim is to ‘close the loop’, and reduce waste sent to 
landfill.21 Although it may be argued that the EU’s strategy is more waste-focused,22 it is not 
without reference to the need to engage producers to design and manufacture in circle-
appropriate ways:23 this may well just reflect the rather tortured history of this strategy which 
involved a failed attempt to produce a waste directive before moving into the broader circular 
economy field.24  
The UK government responded to the EU Commission’s consultations, through the 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).25 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
UK advocated in favour of the circular economic concept in general, with preferences for a 
light-touch regulatory approach which would amongst other things reduce the obligations to 
reuse/recycle waste for SMEs and other such groups,26 as well as increasing data capture, 
usage and sharing across the single market (for design and waste aspects) to more effectively 
                                                 
15 For a translation, see e.g. http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=7025&lib=law. See also G Chen and 
B F C Hsu, ‘Law and Policy in the Sustainability of Affordable Housing: The Case of China’ (2012-13) 30 
UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 259, 284-286. 
16 Circular Economy Promotion Law, Article 2. 
17 Circular Economy Promotion Law, Article 3.  
18 Circular Economy Promotion Law, Article 47. 
19 Circular Economy Promotion Law, Article 15.  Cf R Linzer and S Salhofer, ‘Municipal solid waste recycling 
and the significance of informal sector in urban China’ (2014) 32 Waste Management and Research 896-907 
(substantial proportion of recyclables are collected and processed by informal waste collectors); E Ryan, ‘he 
Elaborate Paper Tiger: Environmental Enforcement and the Rule of Law in China’ (2014) 24 Duke 
Environmental Law and Policy Forum 183, 189-190: ‘The Circular Economy Law … is largely exhortatory and 
contains few enforceable provisions.’ B Gillin, ‘Keeping Up with Chinese Consumerism: Offsetting China’s 
Individually Generated Garbage with Regulatory and Social Mechanisms’ (2011-12) 13 Vermont Journal of 
Environmental Law 69 (regulatory changes will not work without corresponding effective social changes). 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/index_en.htm.  
21 EC, Closing the loop - An EU action plan for the Circular Economy (COM (2015) 614). See further e.g. Y M 
Gordeeva, ‘Recent Developments in EU Environmental Policy and Legislation’ (2016) 13 Journal of European 
Environmental & Planning Law 120, 120-121. 
22 Cf Gregson et al, above n 14, 228-230: the UK’s system of municipal materials recovery facilities is focused 
on weight as a costing system, thus the overall quality of recovered waste is generally irrelevant, which creates 
problems for the circular economy. This is arguably the consequence of focusing on waste-diversion, rather than 
resource-recovery, as ‘the driving metric’.  
23 EC, Closing the loop - An EU action plan for the Circular Economy: Annex I (COM (2015) 614) (listing the 
various ways in which the EU plans to achieve its aims). 
24 See e.g. D Moore, ‘Commission Pledges Tough Circular Economy Package Enforcement’ (6 April 2016), 
http://www.ciwm-journal.co.uk/commission-pledges-tough-enforcement-circular-economy-package/. 
25 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-economy-and-waste-markets-uk-government-response-
to-european-commission-consultations.  
26 DEFRA, UK response (November 2015), above n 8, 3: ‘Exemptions for some SMEs from registering as waste 
carriers if they only transport small amounts of their own non-hazardous waste for example a small shop owner; 
Removing the need for applying for permit exemptions for activities that pose little risk, such as small-scale 
composting by schools’.   
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create and maintain circular business.27 The volume of consumption in the form of public 
procurement, and the way that can contribute to a circular economy, was also recognised.28 
Whilst there are some other brief acknowledgements of the potential impact of moving 
towards circular economies on our understanding of property and commerce (in the sense of 
ownership),29 the DEFRA report appeared content to refer to the work undertaken by the ING 
banking group,30 which is examined in the next section. 
There is thus an identifiable duality at the heart of circular economic thought: on one 
hand it is presented as an opportunity for dealing with production and waste in a more 
efficient manner in terms of environmental costs; on the other hand it can be understood as a 
commercially-focused ideology resting on new methods of diffusing ownership and use-
rights in transaction chains. This latter understanding will now be explored. 
3. THE SHIFT FROM CONTROLLING OWNERSHIP TO CONTROLLING 
USE IN CIRCULAR ECONOMY 
The literature on circular economy has so far failed to identify and examine legal issues in 
any depth, and such brief examples that exist simply raise more questions than anything else. 
Property and ownership issues are at best acknowledged, then swiftly overflown. One rare 
(but still limited) example comes from Hieminga of ING:  
 
the legal and financial systems that support the current business environment may not 
be very conducive to the new setting that the circular economy requires. For example, 
the circular economy is based on the principle that waste does not exist and is a 
valuable resource in (perhaps another company’s) production. But the circular 
economy faces a lot of legal barriers that limit the use of waste as an input.31  
 
There are undoubtedly ownership difficulties surrounding reuse, recycling and waste,32 and 
this could generate control problems: ‘[e]ven in a case where producers would – in the legal 
sense – keep ownership over sold products, the actual control over the products would be 
difficult to ensure.’33 One way around this might be through adopting a so-called “ownership-
heavy” approach. Hieminga suggests that such an approach can be effective in circular 
economic practice. He uses the example of how Van Scherpenzeel, a Dutch recycling 
company, owns the materials throughout their supply chain in the recycling sector. They own 
the waste from its collection, through its recycling, until it is reused.34  
This ownership-heavy approach has a flip-side: contracting becomes key in 
controlling the use of goods. This is in turn connected to another change, though this is more 
conceptual and policy-orientated: a shift from ownership to access and use as being central to 
                                                 
27 See generally Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK response to European Commission 
consultation of member states on the circular economy (October 2015) (at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475862/circ-economy-eu-
consult-uk-response.pdf). 
28 See e.g. DEFRA, UK response (November 2015), above n 8, 2-3. 
29 Ibid, 16: facilitation of reuse through e.g. ‘[e]xamining other opportunities to promote greater reusability and 
reparability in product design and support trade in second hand products while continuing to ensure effective 
regulation, including product standards for reuse and repair.’ 
30 DEFRA, UK response (October 2015), above n 27, 8.   
31 See e.g. Hieminga, above n 2, 35. 
32 C Dalhammar, ‘The Application of “Life Cycle Thinking” in European Environmental Law: Theory and 
Practice’ (2015) 12 Journal of European Environmental & Planning Law 97, 106-107 
33 Ibid, 107 fn 31. 
34 Hieminga, above n 2, 32. 
Page 6 of 27 
 
consumption.35 This requires acknowledging a key effect of taking an ownership-heavy 
approach. Such an approach will concentrate and centralise ownership in the initiator in a 
circular economic transaction. They will want to control as many aspects of the goods’ use as 
possible. These brief points alert us to potential problems regarding property, ownership and 
control in commercial context in circular economies. Three interconnected issues arise here 
when examined through a circular economy lens. First, what will be the effect of the shift 
from ownership to use? Second, what will be the role of property (title/ownership) in 
governing transactions (and the consequence of transactions) in circular economies? 
Interrelated to this examination is the role of contracts in this field: where property rules fail 
to fully and/or accurately replicate participants’ wishes, contracts will step in. Third, given 
the role of property in sales, and the importance of contracting in circular economic 
transactions, are circular economic transactions capable of being sales? 
3.1 SHIFT FROM “OWNERSHIP” TO “USE” 
Fundamental to circular economy is the need to shift focus away from an ownership-
perspective to a use-perspective as to our relationship with goods. What needs to be 
understood is that this shift from ownership to use is one of permanent consequence for the 
lifespan of the goods. Ownership acts as a potential blockage to circular economies; focusing 
on the use of the goods enables a more fine-grained level of control and thus opening up the 
contractual agreements for use to greater modification than ordinarily would be case. This 
may require contemplation of alternative commercial transactions which would more 
accurately represent a use-exchange model.  
Hieminga provides eight conclusions about what may be necessary for financing 
practice in circular economies; it is suggested they also have broader commercial and legal 
implications, impacting on specific areas such as sale. The eight conclusions are:36 (1) 
multiple forms of capital will be needed for financing circular business models; (2) pay per 
use models require emphasising cash flow timings; (3) ‘[c]ontracts are pivotal in financing 
circular economic models’;37 (4) pay per use increases the importance of creditworthiness; (5) 
value will be sought and found in second-hand markets; (6) end of use value needs to be 
accounted for; (7) ‘[s]upply chain finance can facilitate the circularity of supply chains and is 
expected to evolve towards earlier states of the supply chain’;38 (8) there are different and 
unpredictable implications. These points reveal various different potential methods for 
concentrating ownership and extending control through multiple parties. It is worth 
expanding on some of Hieminga’s analysis. 
Contracts will be ‘pivotal’. This is both a cause and consequence of concentrating 
ownership. In the context of developments in pay per use, ‘pay per use models value is first 
and of all created in the continuation of the contract instead of a one time sales value in the 
linear business model.’39 The potential for long-term contracting, throughout the supply 
chain, further emphasises the importance of contractual continuity.40 This is matched by the 
importance of the terms of such contracts. As Hieminga suggests ‘If producers retain 
ownership of products during their life cycle it provides them with strong incentives to look 
after these products, maintain them well and make them valuable at the end of life. From a 
                                                 
35 Ibid, 6. This shift is clearly evident in circular economy literature, such as the Intelligent Assets report, above 
n 13. 
36 Ibid, 37-46 
37 Ibid, 39. 
38 Ibid, 44. 
39 Ibid, 38. 
40 Ibid, 45. 
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circular point of view this has strong advantages but it comes with increased financial 
obligations.’41 It is not difficult to see, in light of the proprietary nature of English asset 
financing law generally, that the shift from ownership to contracted-use could be problematic 
for asset financing in a circular economy.42 The structures of property rights, and ownership 
interests, could impinge on material flows within a circular economy. Manipulating 
proprietary interests in assets, by utilising legal and equitable divisions, may be less flexible 
than delineating between personal use-rights.43 What follows illustrates how shifts towards 
use may create conceptual problems between English law and circular economy, whilst also 
indicating possible ways in which English law would fit well in circular economies. 
Proponents of circular economy seem to suggest quite radical transaction forms, and 
some see potential structural danger with the shift from ownership to use. For Gregson et al, 
it involves ‘nothing short of a wholesale transformation of the basis of contemporary 
capitalism and consumption’.44 Hieminga suggests a possible shift from business to business 
(B2B) or business to consumer (B2C) transactions using money as an exchange medium, to 
one where  
 
[n]ew market segments arise in which consumers interact with other consumers (C2C) 
and in which economic agents act both as manufacturer as well as consumer (C2B). 
Money is the main, but not necessarily the sole, medium of exchange as goods or 
services are for example exchanged against energy, time or waste.45  
 
This change may well have implications in the conceptualisation of circular economy 
transactions, but it is worth remembering that English law occasionally displays considerable 
ambivalence towards attaching overriding importance to ownership. It is quite content with 
consequences of dividing types of transaction according to whether they transfer ownership. 
The obvious historical example is the development of hire-purchase in the late nineteenth 
century, which resulted in a doctrinal distinction between sales and hire-purchase.46 Very 
recently the Supreme Court set the framework for sui generis retention of title clauses outside 
the sales law framework; this will be examined further below.47  
Consumption for use rather than ownership seems to have rapidly become the prime 
form of consumption in the car market. Recent trends towards transactions that enable 
financiers to maintain control down the chain of transactions has led to concerns about the 
volumes of debt accrued through such transactions.48 Prior to that there were concerns about 
the development of sub-prime asset financing through so-called log-book loans. There were 
numerous calls for reform, which appear to be succeeding with the introduction of a Goods 
Mortgages Bill in the June 2017 Queen’s Speech following a Law Commission Report into 
                                                 
41 Ibid, 46. 
42 Ibid, 39.  
43 Ibid, 51: ‘traditional leasing models are structured for manufacturers or vendors of ‘hard assets’ such as cars, 
trucks, trailers, copiers or medical equipment. These assets can be repossessed and remarketed in case of default 
or bankruptcy which makes it “true asset backed finance”. The circular economy however is not limited to these 
“hard assets” with well developed second hand markets. Developing leasing models for “softer assets” first 
requires acceptance by financers of contractual comfort instead of legal ownership over assets.’ 
44 Gregson et al, above n 14, 224, citing B Su, A Heshmati, Y Geng, & X Yu, ‘A review of the circular economy 
in China: Moving from rhetoric to implementation’ (2013) 42 Journal of Cleaner Production 215–227, 217. 
45 Hieminga, above n 2, 6. 
46 Helby v Matthews [1895] AC 471. 
47 Text following n 81. 
48 P Inman, ‘MPs and charities urge car leasers to publish sub-prime loan figures’ (Sunday 2 July 2017, The 
Observer, https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/jul/02/car-leasers-publish-sub-prime-lending-figures-mps-
charities. 
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this area.49 Yet the point here is that this is just another illustration of consumers being 
willing to trade ownership (or at least a risk to ownership) whilst being able to retain use-
rights, and the likely form of the legislation will be that such trade-offs will continue to be 
allowed.50 Such analysis can be applied to potential circular economies more broadly. And as 
will be seen, whilst there may be changes wrought on commercial practices, moves to 
contract-focused transactions at the expense of ownership would be hardly novel in terms of 
modern English legal history. 
On the other hand, problems might arise in the context of accession of goods. 
Hieminga gives the example of a situation where Philips, the electronics giant, might want to 
install a pay per use lighting system, ‘and take responsibility for end of life disposal of the 
armatures and lamps’, but in doing so they run the risk that such goods accede to the realty 
and become subject to third party claims.51 Hieminga goes on to suggest that ownership and 
accession issues will be resolved through contract:  
 
There are practical workarounds available. Although legal ownership could be lost 
through accession parties can remain the economic owner of the goods through 
binding agreements. Parties can sign a contract that not only specifies the payment 
structure to use the service, but they can also agree upon what should be done in case 
things go wrong. And legally agreements must always be kept! In legal terminology: 
pacta sunt servanda. This might give both the supplier and financer enough comfort to 
close a deal.52  
 
This approach is legally dubious. English law has regrettably, and arguably incorrectly, taken 
the approach that where goods become fixtures any prior owner or supplier loses priority 
regardless of any contractual agreement with the receiver.53 One ray of hope here is in the 
final sentence in the quote above: if the supplier agrees with third parties that they have some 
form of priority then than can be protected, though only contractually.54  
Another approach is to reverse our focus, and examine the extent to which proactive 
control in the absence of ownership rights can function to maintain circular economies. In the 
context of the Philips lighting example above, Philips runs the risk of a liquidator terminating 
the contract. However,  
 
Philips can build in a technical feature that allows them to turn off the service 
(lighting) remotely. With such a ‘red button option’ the liquidator has a strong 
incentive to continue the contract because otherwise the suppliers turns off the service 
and the property is worth less. However, such technical solutions are not always 
available or could raise legal issues.55 
 
                                                 
49 Details of the bill are here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/queens-speech-2017-background-
briefing-notes. See also Law Commission, Bills of Sale (Law Com No 396, 12 September 2016); Replacing bills 
of sale: a new Goods Mortgages Bill. Consultation on draft clauses (July 2017). 
50 It is suggested that a similar process will likely occur with the car-finance market, ie such transactions will be 
regulated (lightly) but not prohibited. 
51 Hieminga, above n 2, 39. 
52 Ibid, 39. 
53 S Thomas, ‘Mortgages, fixtures, fittings and security over personal property’ (2015) 66 NIQL 343 (noting the 
convoluted judicial attempts to reconcile old doctrine with new commercial practices which involved novel 
utilisations of goods). 
54 Ibid, 39: ‘As such the circular business must yield a high enough return to compensate for the additional risk.’ 
55 Ibid, 40. 
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Contemporary and future shifts from ownership to use will likely be brought about by, and 
accelerated by, changes in technology as much as any other factor. Technological 
development, encapsulated in memetic phrases such as ‘the internet of things’,56 ‘autonomous 
vehicles’, ‘wearable tech’, and so on, points strongly towards trends of automation, 
miniaturisation, connectivity and ultimately control.57 Smart objects enable digital control 
and manipulation, both of the environment and more crucially by the environment. 
Interactivity is generally a multidirectional process, enabling connections to be drawn and 
maintained at very limited cost over long time periods.58 Such control capacity has been a 
boon to those operating in the field of smart goods and technology, as intellectual property 
law regimes provide effective mechanisms for down-chain legal and practical control of the 
use of objects.59  
Three brief, and notorious, examples will illustrate: Amazon’s deletion of text-files 
purchased by Amazon Kindle e-reader owners where the files breached copyright (ironically 
of 1984 and Animal Farm);60 the printer manufacturer HP using a firmware update to prevent 
printers using non-proprietary ink;61 and the agricultural plant manufacturer John Deree 
attempting to prevent users from modifying software and hardware elements of goods.62 Each 
example points to different behaviour by both user and manufacturer, and there was no 
consistency in the end result,63 but at the core for each was an illustration of the down-stream 
control that could be maintained in the practical sense. The technological capacity to 
unilaterally delete an infringing file, or to alter the nature of the goods, is clear in the first two 
examples. But for both examples, and more pertinently the third, what is also on show is the 
legal strength backing up such contractually-based actions against digital assets (software) 
                                                 
56 See e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/internet-things; http://www.internet-of-things-research.eu/;  S 
Thomas, ‘Security interests in intellectual property: proposals for reform’ (2017) 37 Legal Studies 214, 216-
220; K Manwaring, ‘A legal analysis of socio-technological change arising out of eObjects’ (5 January 2016) 
UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2016-15, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2690024; W K Hon, C Millard 
and J Singh, ‘Twenty Legal Considerations for Clouds of Things’ (4 January 2016) Queen Mary School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 216/2016, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2716966.   
57 Privacy concerns burn brightly here: A G Ferguson, ‘The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of 
Effects’ (2016) 104 Cal L Rev 807; M W Bailey, ‘Seduction by Technology: Why Consumers Opt Out of 
Privacy by Buying into the Internet of Things’ (2016) 84 Texas L Rev 1023. 
58 Cf Hieminga, above n 2, 46: ‘Tracking sold products and services in order to perform maintenance over the 
life span or take them back at the end of the lifecycle requires knowledge about the whereabouts and conditions 
of the so called ‘installed base’. Innovations like the ‘internet of things’ make easy tracking possible but require 
investments.’ 
59 See generally S Thomas, ‘Sale of Goods and Intellectual Property: Problems with Ownership’ (2014) 
Intellectual Property Forum 25-43; S Thomas, ‘Goods with embedded software: obligations under Section 12 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979’ (2012) 26 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 165-183. See 
also e.g. M A Lemley, ‘IP in a World Without Scarcity’ (2015) 90 NYU L Rev 460 (the reduced relevance of 
scarcity brought about by technological change may lead to reactions by IPR holders, such as attempts to control 
goods). 
60 B Stone, ‘Amazon erases Orwell books from Kindle devices’ New York Times (17 July 
2009) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html; ‘Amazon sued 
for Kindle deletion of Orwell’ CBS News (31 July 2009) available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/31/tech/main5201198.shtml; K DeGroot Carter, ‘KNOW THIS: E-
Books Update: Amazon’s disappearing E-Books debacle’ (6 August 2009) available at 
http://www.knowsomethingproject.com/publishing/0809ebooksdeleted.html. 
61 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3797408/Licence-print-money-HP-faces-backlash-blocking-
customers-using-cheaper-ink-cartridges-printers.html; 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/20/hp-inkjet-printers-unofficial-cartridges-software-update. 
62 K Wiens ‘We can’t let John Deere destroy the very idea of ownership’ Wired Business (21 
April 2015), available at http://www.wired.com/2015/04/dmca-ownership-john-deere/.  
63 Amazon refused to back down. HP did back down: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37503139. The 
John Deree case is continuing. 
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and its capacity to extend into controlling the use of tangible things.64 This may help to 
protect the assets in the face of rather unclear and possibly flimsy provisions for the transfer 
of property rights in digital assets.65 
These examples show the importance of two aspects underlying any shift in the 
relationship between ownership and use: the role of contracting (especially that of licencing) 
and the (related) capacity to manipulate the location and effect of the title of goods.66 
Manipulating title and retaining ownership may seem like a powerful response, but as will be 
seen, it is only really a catalyst for drawing attention to any underlying contractual agreement 
as between relevant parties. In this context, we must be wary of the potential impact of 
licences, which grows in the context of digital technologies.67 Moreover, we must 
acknowledge the different time-scales that technological and legal developments operate on. 
The shift from ownership to use is a policy goal of circular economies. Such shifts can be 
accommodated in English law. However, policy goals for circular economies will more likely 
be first met by technological developments, and law will invariably be playing catch-up. This 
should make us aware of the possibility of English law utilising pre-existing forms and 
structures in order to cope with novel commercial practices; how this utilisation can occur 
thus needs analysis. 
3.2 ROLE OF “PROPERTY” AND “TITLE” IN SALES 
The meaning and treatment of ownership, in a practical sense and in terms of the structure 
and content of legal regimes, is clearly commercially important. Whereas sales are functional 
commercial activities, in the sense of being easily affected and manipulated by connected 
aspects of practical commerce such as financing choices and requirements, business 
structuring decisions, and decisions over control and use of assets, they still are governed by 
a body of formal rules combining in a property regime.68 The Sale of Goods Act 1979 
provides a body of rules pertaining to the transfer of property in sales, which is somewhat 
necessary by virtue of the definition of sale as being the transfer of property in the goods.69 
The rules on property concern various different aspects of transactions, providing structures 
which help ascertain who has standing, as well as determining liability for aspects such as 
loss or damage to goods.70 Section 12 of the 1979 Act sets out an obligation to pass good 
                                                 
64 See also e.g. L Feiler, ‘Separation of ownership and the authorization to use personal computers: Unintended 
effects of EU and US law on IT security’ (2011) 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal 
131, 132–133 (noting different instances of IPR holders affecting ownership and/or usage of goods). 
65 See e.g. S Thomas, ‘Security interests in intellectual property: proposals for reform’ (2017) 37 Legal Studies 
214; M B M Loos and C Mak, ‘Remedies for Buyers in Case of Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content’, ad 
hoc briefing paper for the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs, May 2012, (Amsterdam Law 
School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-71, 2012) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087626 (recommending 
greater clarity on the transfer of ownership rights over digital content). 
66 This is not to deny any other element’s role in this process. Here the focus is limited for clarity and economy. 
67 Above n 59. See also A J Casey and A Niblett, ‘Self-Driving Contracts’ (1 March 2017), available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927459 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927459. 
68 Cf J Devenney and M Kenny, ‘The omission of personal property law from the proposed common European 
sales law: the Hamlet syndrome … without the prince?’ [2015] JBL 607, 618: ‘Given that the sale of goods is, 
fundamentally, about the passing of property, any exclusion of property is significant because it threatens the 
overall coherence as well as the future prospects of the proposed CESL.’ 
69 Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 2(1). 
70 Re Waite [1927] 1 Ch 606; Re Goldcorp Exchange [1995] 1 AC 74. Determining property is important for 
insurance purposes as well, because in English law, under SGA s 20(1), unless otherwise agreed, risk of loss 
passes with property. Tort law is also relevant here. In the event of a conversion or negligence claim, the 
claimant must be at least entitled to a right to possess the goods: The Aliakmon [1986] AC 785 (negligence); 
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title, and failure to do so voids the sale.71 Property in the goods is deemed not to pass in 
unascertained goods,72 but party intention is key to determining whether property has 
passed.73 In the event of a failure to ascertain an appropriate intention, the Sale of Goods Act 
1979, section 18 provides a variety of different rules to enable that intention to be 
determined. Passing title is essential, and you cannot pass a title that you do not have: nemo 
dat quod non habet.74 In such cases an unsuspecting purchaser may be able to avail 
themselves of a number of exceptions to the nemo dat rule,75 though it is often a complicated 
and treacherous path to success.76 There have been relatively recent important changes 
concerning the property rights in bulks,77 and most recently there has been a removal and 
replication of provisions concerning consumers.78  
The importance of property, title and ownership concepts, how they are used (and can 
be abused, or may not work well), is clear for English law.79 Despite some confusion and 
debate of the meaning of “property” and “title”,80 this chapter will side-step that issue by 
focusing on some other implications. Here three points can be drawn out. The first concerns 
the problems in English law concerning recent case-law on retention of title clause. The 
second and third points broaden the examination and illustrate how on one hand a wide 
variety of jurisdictions employ rules concerning obligation to pass good title, and then on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kuwait Airways v Iraqi Airways [2002] 2 AC 883 (conversion). However, this chapter will focus on the sales 
regime. 
71 Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500. 
72 Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 16. 
73 Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 17. 
74 Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 21. 
75 The core exceptions are found in Sale of Goods Act 1979, sections 21 (estoppel), 23 (voidable title), 24 (seller 
in possession), and 25 (buyer in possession). The other core provisions are mercantile agency in the Factors Act 
1889, section 2, and the hire-purchase exception for motor vehicles under the Hire-Purchase Act 1964, Part II 
(re-enacted by the Consumer Credit Act 1974, section 192, sch 4, para [22]; amended by the Sale of Goods Act 
1979, section 63 and sch 2, para [4]). 
76 See e.g. S Thomas, ‘The Role of Authorization in Title Conflicts Involving Retention of Title Clauses: Some 
American Lessons’ (2014) 43 Common Law World Review 29-61 (concerning the complicated relationship 
between the very similar provisions on seller and buyer in possession under the Factors Act 1889 sections 8 and 
9 and those in the Sale of Goods Act 1979); S Thomas, ‘Transfers of Documents of Title under English Law and 
the Uniform Commercial Code’ [2012] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 573-605 (problems 
with voidable title). 
77 Sale of Goods Act 1979, sections 20A and B. 
78 The Consumer Rights Act 2015 has the functional effect of removing all consumer law from the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, which can now be considered a type of commercial code. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 
makes some changes (such as those concerning digital products) and removed and retained some recent changes 
to the old statutory regime (such as rules providing that risk does not pass to consumers until delivery in 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, section 29), but a number of property rules remain the same (such as those 
concerning transfer of property in Consumer Rights Act 2015, section 4, the obligation to pass good title in 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, section 17, and title conflicts, which the explanatory notes para 33 directs back to 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provisions). Economy unfortunately prevents analysis of these issues here. See 
further e.g. S Whittaker, ‘Distinctive features of the new consumer contract law’ (2017) 133 LQR 47 (property 
noted once in passing); P Giliker, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 – a bastion of European consumer rights?’ 
(2017) 37 Legal Studies 78 (no mention of property). 
79G Battersby and A D Preston, ‘The Concepts of “Property,” “Title” and “Owner” Used in the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893’ (1972) 35 MLR 268; L C Ho, ‘Some Reflection on “Property” and “Title” in the Sale of Goods Act’ 
[1997] CLJ 571; G Battersby, ‘A Reconsideration of “Property” and “Title” in the Sale of Goods Act’ [2001] 
JBL 1. See generally also C Debattista, ‘Transferring property in international sales: conflicts and substantive 
rules under English law’ (1995) 26 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 29; T O’Sullivan, ‘The Sale of 
Goods Act 1908: Rules for Passing of Property in Specific Goods. One Hundred Years On – Have the Rules 
Stood the Test of Time?’ (2008) 14 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 190. 
80 Cf K N Llewellyn, Cases and Materials in the Law of Sales (Callaghan and Co, Chicago 1933) xiv; K N 
Llewellyn, ‘Through title to contract and a bit beyond’ (1938) 15 NYU Law Quarterly Review 159. 
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other hand how the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods operates its 
notoriously property-free regime. This will show how contracts can often take precedence as 
the determining factor in ascertaining the location and transference of property, but that this 
may have problematic results. Furthermore, the prevalence of rules protecting purchasers by 
obliging owners to pass good title creates a tension between a body of doctrine allowing 
commercial control of goods down a chain of transactions through contractual manipulation 
of property and another body of doctrine protecting those down-stream from suffering such 
infringements.  
3.2.1 Retention of Title 
English commercial law’s avoidance of an overly strict regulation of commerce along with a 
tendency to assume that parties can, and are best left to, sort things out for themselves, 
means, as Gullifer puts it, ‘the [statutory] provisions as to the passing of property … 
exemplify freedom of contract.’81 English law provides that a seller can retain title. The Sale 
of Goods Act 1979, section 19 states that sellers can impose obligations, making the passing 
of property contingent on other events (e.g. full payment). In addition, there has been a forty 
year juridical meander from this legislative starting point, resulting in a complex and unclear 
body of law.82 It is not clear the extent to which parties holding a retention of title clause can 
reach into and beyond assets, products and mixtures, though we can agree with Gullifer that 
retention of title clauses give sellers ‘a powerful method of proprietary protection’. For the 
purposes of her analysis, she noted this was protection against ‘counterparty credit risk’, 
looking to the retention of title’s usual role as securing the seller.83 Acknowledging the 
primary function of retention of title clauses is to secure the seller in lending to the 
purchaser,84 such clauses also demonstrate the role of contract in ascertaining proprietary 
rights. This can creates problems, whether due to deliberate skilled negotiating and drafting, 
or whether due to error or incompetence.85 In addition, there is the impact (or lack thereof) of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 49(1): the seller’s right to sue on the price depends on 
the passage of property. As the sale under retention of title terms will not lead to passage of 
property until the terms are met, then the seller could not sue on the price until that point.  
Matters have been recently complicated by the Court of Appeal in the Caterpillar 
case,86 and the Supreme Court’s decision in the Bunkers case.87 In Caterpillar the Court of 
Appeal held that the effect of the Sale of Goods Act, section 49(1) – the seller’s right to sue 
on the price depends on the passage of property – meant that the seller could not actually sue 
on the price due to the presence of a retention of title clause. Only when title passed would 
                                                 
81 L Gullifer, ‘“Sales” on retention of title terms: is the English law analysis broken?’ (2017) 133 LQR 244, 245. 
82 Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v Romalpa Aluminium [1976] 1 WLR 676 (CA); Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] 
Ch 228; Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd [1981] Ch 25; Clough Mill Ltd v Martin [1984] 3 All 
ER 982; Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 485; E Pfeiffer 
Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150; Compaq Computer Ltd v 
Abercorn Group Ltd [1991] BCC 484; Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG [1991] 2 AC 339. See generally 
e.g. L Gullifer, ‘Retention of title clauses: a question of balance’ in A Burrows and E Peel (eds), Contract Terms 
(Oxford, OUP 2007) 285. 
83 Gullifer, above n 81, 246. 
84 There is a long and complex debate about whether retention of title clauses are, or if not whether they could 
be re-characterised as a security interest. Here it is simply assumed that such clauses function as security 
interests. 
85 Gullifer, above n 81, 249-250. 
86 Caterpillar (NI) Ltd (formerly FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd) v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd [2013] 
EWCA Civ 1232; [2014] 1 WLR 2365. 
87 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v OW Bunker Malta Ltd [2016] UKSC 23; [2016] AC 1034. See also A 
Tettenborn, ‘Of Bunkers and Retention of Title: When is a Sale Not a Sale?’ [2016] LMCLQ 24. 
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the right arise. Whilst Longmore LJ notoriously left this argument by declaiming this just 
showed there were costs as well as benefits to the retention of title clause,88 Gullifer criticised 
this on the policy grounds that it ignores the fact that in cases of solvent buyers sellers want 
the price, not repossessed goods,89 and welcomed the Supreme Court’s overruling on this 
point.90 In the Bunkers case the Supreme Court held, in essence, that the contract concerned 
was not a contract of sale, a conclusion Gullifer rightly describes as having ‘far reaching 
consequences’.91  
Gullifer has provided an excellent overview of the state of law following these 
decisions,92 noting how the retention of title doctrine and the Sale of Goods Act 1979 are no 
longer compatible due to the Act’s age and conceptual shortcomings.93 Her criticism of the 
agency explanation given by the Court of Appeal in Caterpillar as opening up a raft of 
commercial difficulties in financing context is on point.94 For the purposes of this chapter, it 
is worth noting that the effect of these decisions, in the context of the agency rationale, is to 
reinforce the contractual dominance of sales transactions which in itself will actually fit well 
within the context of the circular economy. This point is developed further in sub-section 3.3 
below.  
It is also worth teasing out a specific boon for circular economic practice arising from 
the Supreme Court’s approach in Bunkers. By demonstrating the potential of a contractual 
transaction for the using up of tangibles that does not meet the requirements of a contract of 
sale of goods, the Court has provided (almost certainly inadvertently) a mechanism for 
commercial initiators in circular economies to restrict the nature of the transaction in a way 
that will be to their benefit.95 By making sure that the transaction is not one of sale, 
complications arising from obligations to pass good title might be avoided, as might 
obligations against interference with quiet possession. Gullifer suggested that the obligations 
to pass good title are one particular thorny problem with the result of Bunkers, and she argued 
inter alia that a sui generis legislative response would need to implement a version of section 
12 in order to resolve those problems.96 Here it is suggested that circular economic 
practitioners, especially initiators of circular economic transactions, would resist such moves.  
A particular implication not explicitly considered but which arises by implication of 
Gullifer’s examination of the effects of this case law on the using up or perishing of goods,97 
is that on Re Highways Food situations.98 When A sells to B on retention of title terms, and B 
sells to C on the same terms, which prevent title passing until the price is paid, it is possible 
now to say such transactions are not sales. In Benjamin on Sale, it states that ‘[w]here an 
owner is bound by a sui generis supply contract [of the sort in Bunkers] concluded by a 
mercantile agent, it should follow, though the position is not free from doubt, that the 
recipient of goods remains at liberty to use or consume them, even if the property has not yet 
                                                 
88 Caterpillar [2014] 1 WLR 2365 [56]. 
89 Gullifer, above n 94. 
90 Gullifer, above n 81, 253. 
91 Ibid, 254. 
92 Gullifer, above n 81. 
93 Ibid, 250. 
94 L Gullifer, ‘The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties’ [2014] LMCLQ 564. 
95 At this point, ‘initiators’ is used instead of ‘sellers’. Such actors will initiate the commercial transaction 
(whether circular or linear) by being the first to dispose of the goods, but, and this will become clearer later in 
this chapter, they will not be disposing of the property in the goods and thus cannot be technically be called 
“sellers”. 
96 Gullifer, above n 81, 262-263. 
97 Ibid, 259-260. 
98 Re Highway Foods International Ltd, Mills v Harris (Wholesale Meat Ltd) [1995] 1 BCLC 209, [1995] BCC 
271. See generally S Thomas ‘The Role of Authorization in Title Conflicts Involving Retention of Title Clauses: 
Some American Lessons’ (2014) 43 Common Law World Review 29-61. 
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passed, accounting to the agent supplying the goods for the price.’99 Whether the same logic 
applies in the Re Highway Foods situation is doubtful (Benjamin on Sale appears to reject the 
possibility). The extent of this effect of Bunkers must be left to another time, but the 
suggested consequence has the effect of further indicating the increased importance that is 
attached to the contractual arrangement between the parties.  
3.2.2 Obligations to Pass Good Title 
The obligation to pass good title, under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 12 (for 
consumers, the Consumer Rights Act 2015, section 17) is not a particularly ancient implied 
term, arising only in the mid nineteenth century.100 Nevertheless, its importance was shown 
during a House of Commons Public Bill Committee Debate on the Consumer Rights Bill: 
‘Being able to use something freely and fairly is a fundamental part of buying it.’101 The 
obligations under section 12 consist of a condition that the seller has the right to sell the 
goods, and two warranties of quiet possession and freedom from encumbrances. The right to 
sell has been interpreted as being distinct from the power to pass to title ie to sell.102 Failure 
to meet this obligation can have significant and potentially questionable results, such as a 
windfall for purchasers who effectively face no set-off for their use of the goods between 
acquisition and termination for breach of section 12.103 Yet it should not be thought that the 
warranties are of limited import here. Though their status means no right to terminate arises 
from their breach, consideration of the implications of their potential reach reveals some 
potential problems. In Microbeads AG v Vinhurst Road Markings Ltd,104 an English company 
bought some a line-marking machine from a Swiss company. Some years later a different 
English company sued for patent infringement, seeking an injunction to prevent the use of the 
machines. Lord Denning MR held that although the infringement of the warranty of quite 
possession arose after the initial sale, the obligation to prevent this infringement continued 
regardless of the seller’s innocence. The seller had to bear the loss.105 More recently the 
unauthorised imposition of a time lock on a computer system was held to be a breach of the 
warranty of quite possession.106 Combined these cases begin to provide the basis for a 
valuable form of protection against actions based on down-stream facing attempts to exert 
control over the use of goods. What is particularly valuable is the application of the section 
12 protections here in the context of claims by intellectual property rights holders; patents in 
the case above, and trademarks in the earlier case Niblett Ltd v Confectioners’ Materials Co 
Ltd.107  
                                                 
99 M G Bridge (ed), Benjamin on Sale (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2014) [7-048]. 
100 Morely v Attenborough (1849) 3 Ex Ch 500 (denied the existence of an implied warranty of title); Eichholz v 
Bannister (1864) 17 CB NS 708 (the very act of selling goods meant the seller held out that he was the owner of 
the goods unless the circumstances implied otherwise). 
101 Hansard, February 25, 2014, col 165 (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (Jenny Willott)). 
102 Niblett Ltd v Confectioners’ Materials Co Ltd [1921] 3 KB 387; Great Elephant Corp v Trafigura Beheer BV 
(The Crudesky) [2012] EWHC 1745 (Comm); [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 415; [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 503 
(reversed on appeal: [2013] EWCA Civ 905: this was on different grounds, and the conclusions from the QBD 
on the SGA s12 points were expressly approved: paras 20-21. 
103 Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500. 
104 [1975] 1 WLR 218. 
105 Ibid, 222-223. 
106 Rubicon Computer Systems Ltd v United Paints Ltd (CA) (2000) 2 TCLR 453. 
107 [1921] 3 KB 387. 
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This power of intangible rights holders to control the use of tangibles,108 begins to 
disturb notions of ownership as much as any claims by retention of title clause holders. In the 
event of successful actions, the goods-holders are liable to the rights holder, and their source 
of recourse is their vendor.109 In the event of vendor insolvency or disappearance the loss thus 
falls on the purchaser. A similar logic of course applies to the section 12 condition as it does 
to the warranties; the liability to the rights holder causes the liability, but the financial loss 
caused falls on the purchaser if they have no chance of claiming damages even if they can 
terminate the contract. The overwhelming volumes of intellectual property rights encased in 
smart objects raises two potential problems. The first is whether or not the section 12 
jurisprudence will easily apply to the quite different conditions of contemporary objects of 
commerce compared to the 1970s (Microbeads) or the 1920s (Niblett). The second, and more 
dangerous, is potential utilisation of the inequality of bargaining power by parties wishing to 
authorise the use of their intellectual property by means of contracted-for licences. This 
would be in line with the shifting from ownership to control. Rather than using the sword or 
spear of retention of title clauses, there may be a preference for the entanglement possibility 
of contractual licences, limiting ownership and enhancing control over not only that specific 
intellectual property which the licence covers but by the consequences of technological 
integration the goods the intellectual property inheres in. By taking situations outside section 
12, following Bunkers, control without corresponding obligations is a strong possibility. 
3.2.3 CISG 
A useful, brute, comparator to the English sales regime is the CISG. There, the lack of 
specific rules on property law is well known.110 Article 4 states that the CISG only governs 
‘the formation of the contract of the sale’; the ‘effect which the contract may have on the 
property in the goods sold’ is not a concern of the CISG ‘except as otherwise expressly 
provided’.111 According to the CISG Secretariat Commentary, this  
 
makes it clear that the Convention does not govern the passing of property in the 
goods sold. In some legal systems property passes at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. In other legal systems property passes at some later time such as the time at 
which the goods are delivered to the buyer. It was not regarded possible to unify the 
rule on this point nor was it regarded necessary to do so since rules are provided by 
                                                 
108 See e.g. S Thomas, ‘Security interests in intellectual property: proposals for reform’ (2017) 37 Legal Studies 
214, 240-242. 
109 For a very recent demonstration, see e.g. R v M and others [2017] UKSC 58 (no differentiation between 
goods produced without authorisation from a trade mark holder, and goods sold without authorisation (so called 
“grey goods”) vis-à-vis criminalisation under the Trade Marks Act 1994 section 92(1)). 
110 See generally e.g. T Q Thang, ‘Passing of Property Under Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
Should the CISG Regulate the Transfer of Property?’ (2004) available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/thang.html; M Wesiack, ‘Is the CISG too much influenced by civil law 
principles of contract law rather than common law principles of contract law? Should the CISG contain a rule on 
the passing of property?’ (2004) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/wesiack.html; M 
Torsello, ‘Transfer of Ownership and the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention: a regretful lack of uniform 
regulation?’ (2000) International Business Law Journal 939; E Visser, ‘Favor Emptoris: Does the CISG Favor 
the Buyer?’ (1998) 67 UMKC L Rev 77; W Khoo, ‘Article 4’ in C Bianca and M Bonell (eds), Commentary on 
the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (1987) 44, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/khoo-bb4.html; R M Goode, ‘Reflections on the Harmonisation of 
Commercial Law’ (1991) 1 Uniform L Rev 54; A Romein, ‘The Passing of Risk: A Comparison Between the 
Passing of Risk under the CISG and German Law’ (Heidelberg, June 1999), at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/romein.html. 
111 CISG Article 4.  
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this Convention for several questions linked, at least in certain legal systems, to the 
passing of property; the obligation of the seller to transfer the goods free from any 
right or claim of a third person [see CISG articles 41 and 42]; the obligation of the 
buyer to pay the price [see CISG Article 53]; the passing of the risk of loss or damage 
to the goods [see CISG Articles 66-70]; the obligation to preserve the goods [see 
CISG Articles 85-88].112 
 
There are other areas of the CISG where property is to be found, as a referent or a subject of a 
provision. CISG Article 30 states that ‘[t]he seller must deliver the goods, hand over any 
documents relating to them and transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract 
and this Convention’, indicating that the CISG, whilst rejecting any attempt to provide rules 
on property, still requires the transference of property, and the governance of this 
transference of property is to be undertaken by the contract itself (and not the CISG). Thus on 
the issue of property in sales of goods, the CISG is content with the consensual approaches 
reached in individual transactions by the relevant parties to that transaction. 
One of the major problems here concerns situations involving the insolvency or 
disappearance of parties to sales. Security interests and retention of title clauses, by being 
property matters, are subject to domestic determination.113 By forcing parties to rely on 
domestic law the CISG’s claim to uniformity is undermined, and there may be practical 
problems for such parties if the international transaction suddenly gets grounded in one or 
another domestic jurisdiction.114 However, the CISG does provide guidance regarding 
obligations to pass good title, in Articles 41 and 42. Article 41 obliges sellers to deliver goods 
‘free from any right or claim of a third party’. Article 42 provides for such freedom ‘from any 
right or claim of a third party based on industrial property or other intellectual property, of 
which at the time of the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could not have been 
aware’.115 There has not been much in the way of extensive analysis of this provision, 
rendering its scope and meaning quite unclear.116 However, the most reasonable 
                                                 
112 The Secretariat Commentary to the CISG (available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-04.html#1). 
113 Roder Zelt-und Hallenkonstruktionen GmbH v Rosedown Park Pty Ltd and Reginald R Eustace [1995] 57 
FCR 216 (Federal Court of Australia); http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950428a2.html; Usinor Industeel v 
Leeco Steel Products (2002 US DC (Ill)) 209 FSupp 2d 880; 47 UCC Rep Serv2d 887; 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020328u1.html; St Paul Guardian Insurance Co v Neuromed Medical System 
& Support (2002 US DC (NY)) 2002 WL 465312; http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020326u1.html; Stolen 
Automobile Case (21 March 2007 Appellate Court Dresden, Germany) 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070321g1.html [see also Automobile Case (22 August 2002 District Court 
Freiburg, Germany) http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020822g1.html - essentially identical]; Milk Packaging 
Equipment Case (15 July 2008 Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration attached to the Serbian Chamber of 
Commerce) http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080715sb.html. 
114 As such there have been proposals to introduce property rules to the CISG: Proposal by Switzerland on 
possible future work by UNCITRAL in the area of international contract law, 8 May 2012 (UN Doc 
A/CN.9/758). See also e.g. L Galler, ‘An Historical and Policy Analysis of the Title Passage Rule in 
International Sales of Personal Property’ (1991) 52 U Pitt L Rev 521; S S Grewal, ‘Risk of Loss in Goods Sold 
During Transit: A Comparative Study of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
the UCC, and the British Sale of Goods Act’ (1991) 14 Loy LA Int & Comp LJ 93. 
115 Article 42(1). Article 42(2) imposes the same notice/knowledge test on the buyer. 
116 The extent of the literature on this Article is: S Kröll, ‘Article 42’ in S Kröll, L Mitselis and P Perales 
Viscasillas (eds), UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (C H Beck and Hart 
Publishing, Munich and Oxford, 2011) 647; B Zeller, ‘Intellectual Property Rights & the CISG Article 42’ 
(2011-12) 15 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 289; I Schwenzer, 
Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the UN Convention on the International sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd 
edn, OUP, Oxford 2010) 648; R M Janal, ‘The Seller’s Responsibility for Third Party Intellectual Property 
Rights under the Vienna Sales Convention’ in C B Andersen and U G Schroeter (eds), Sharing International 
Commercial Law Across National Boundaries: Fechtschrift for Albert H Kritzer on the Occasion of his 
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interpretation has to be that it would have the same broad effect as the English doctrine. 
Article 42 essentially formalises something similar to the approach taken by the English 
courts considering section 12. 
This raises a question: if there is similarity between a “property-heavy” regime and a 
“property-light” regime as to the importance of protecting purchasers by means of holding 
sellers liable for breaches of third party rights is that pointing to the importance of the role of 
property, or is it pointing more towards identifying the role of contract? 
3.3 HOW AND WHY CONTRACTING MAY ERADICATE SALES IN THE CIRCULAR 
ECONOMY 
It is generally considered that there are a far greater proportion of formal contracts in 
international commercial transactions compared to domestic transactions. This is partially 
due to a lack of trust between such parties,117 but there may be a wide range of reasons why 
the parties in international transactions might want a greater level of formality. This 
difference in use of contracts is a key factor when contextualising the multi-party, cross 
border nature of circular economic problems. The potential for control of goods by initial 
parties in the chain of transactions in a circular economy, in order to implement shifts from 
ownership to use as the governing conceptual basis for the transactional value of the thing, 
raises issue of negotiation of the contract, and of contractual licences.  
 The extent of the use of standard form contracts is related to the nature of the subject 
of sale. Commodity transactions are very often undertaken using standard form contracts, 
often issued by relevant trade bodies. On the other hand, sales of bespoke or non-fungible 
goods may well take place under the aegis of a unique, negotiated contract. In the context of 
circular economy though, transactions may, oddly enough, involve both types of contracts, in 
the sense that there may be bespoke contractual arrangements with regard to the whole asset 
combined with standard form agreements for specific aspects or contents of that asset. This is 
most likely to be the case with smart objects: goods which are able to interact with other 
objects and persons, consisting of hardware and software integrated so coherently that it is 
not possible to alter either element with affecting the functions of the smart object. 
The authority to use IPRs is invariably by licence. Licences pervade the digital world. 
The capacity to access software is conditional on agreement to licence terms. These licences 
set out the extent of your powers as a user. The power to alienate, or modify, may be (almost 
certainly will be) restricted. They may include obligations regarding data capture and use. 
Moreover, the capacity to negotiate such terms is limited, not least by the fact that at least in a 
consumer context, they are often not even read.118 Licences may also contain break clauses, 
having the effect of removing authorisation for use. Combined with the technical capacity to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Eightieth Birthday (Wildy, Simonds & Hill Publishing 2008) 203; J A Van Duzer, ‘A Seller’s Responsibility for 
Third Party Intellectual Property Claims: Are the UN Sales Convention Rules Better?’ (2001) 4 Canadian 
International Lawyer 187; C Rauda and G Etier, ‘Warranty for Intellectual Property Rights in the International 
Sale of Goods’ (2000) 4 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 30; A M Shinn, 
‘Liabilities under Article 42 of the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods’ (1993) 2 Minnesota 
Journal of Global Trade 115. 
117 V Gessner, R P Appelbaum and W L F Felstiner, ‘Introduction: The Legal Culture of Global Business 
Transactions’ in R P Appelbaum, W L Felstiner and V Gessner (eds), Rules and Networks: The Legal Culture of 
Global Business Transactions (Hart, Oxford 2001) 1, 23. 
118 See e.g. Y Bakos, F Marotta-Wurgler, and D R Trossen, ‘Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer 
Attention to Standard-Form Contracts’ (2014) 43 The Journal of Legal Studies 1-35. For an amusing example, 
see e.g. A Hern, ‘Thousands sign up to clean sewage because they didn’t read the small print’ The Guardian (17 
July 2017) at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/14/wifi-terms-and-conditions-thousands-sign-
up-clean-sewage-did-not-read-small-print.  
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prevent use of goods for infringements of licences to use software integral to the goods, the 
power of licences for some commercial parties becomes evident.119 The breadth of possibility 
afforded by licences should no doubt attract initiators in circular economies, for whom the 
task is as much about controlling the use of goods down long chains of transactions as it is 
about locating ownership in a particular owner. 
Another point worth briefly mentioning concerns the fact that long-term contractual 
relationships will need to be catered for, and the capacity of English law to provide for such a 
commercial model has been the subject of much debate.120 There is a possible avenue for 
further research in terms of mapping on conceptualisations of relational contracts to circular 
economic practices. There will no doubt be room for examining in particular notions of 
potentially infinite relationships requiring continuing in-contract negotiation and planning for 
a future other than that of contract termination. These are likely to be key normative 
battlegrounds in the debate as to law and circular economy, especially as to how it relates to 
B2C transactions. This would be from a pragmatic stance ie locking consumers in, to more 
political and theoretical questions concerning whether such transactions/agreements are 
suitable in liberal democracies,121 or whether they will perpetuate debt.122   
It can thus be asked whether circular economic transactions will ever be sales. As has 
been seen English law has recently shifted, towards treating retention of title transactions as 
quite distinct from sales. This may have a dual effect: retention of title will not limit the 
possibility to claim for damages in the event of a failure to pay the “price”, which in turn 
increases the likelihood of individualised contracts designed to escape the potential dangers 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The other effect is to potentially collapse together 
understanding of dispositions of digital information such as software under copyright licence 
and dispositions of goods under a retention of title clause, into the same type of transactions 
where title is retained and use is authorised by means of a contractual licence, with whatever 
additional constraints that that form of authorisation can hold. This in turn allows for 
distribution of the licence, through sub-licences to all further users, which would help avoid 
the potential title conflicts that could arise where retention of title clauses were utilised in an 
attempt to achieve the same end. The shift to control over goods, to enable their most 
appropriate journey around a circular economy, will be achieved with greater ease. 
4. HARMONISATION 
The circular economy will inevitably be cross-jurisdictional, immediately raising questions of 
harmonisation. Will circular economies require pre-existing legal harmonisation? Or will 
circular economic practices of themselves result in the harmonisation of legal doctrine? These 
questions will be tentatively explored here, before considering whether something other than 
                                                 
119 A further complication arises when the possibility of self-driving contract, contracts which automatically 
determine enforceable terms in order to reach a defined end result for both parties, is considered. Licences may 
well be manipulated beforehand, or during, automatically without human interferences. See Casey and Niblett, 
above n 67. 
120 See e.g. Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP, Oxford 1999). The nature of relational contracts has a 
rich literature, often starting with Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study’ 
(1968) 28 American Sociology Review 55. The work of Ian Macneil is often at the heart of the debate; for a 
useful overview and development of his work, see e.g. R Austen-Baker, ‘Comprehensive Contract Theory: a 
Four-Norm Model of Contract Relations’ (2009) 25 Journal of Contract Law 216.  
121 Cf M J Radin, Boilerplate: the Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton NJ, 2013). 
122 Cf D Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (2011) (Melville House Publishing, London 2014) arguing 
exchange is definitely terminable, because it is between equals, but unequal transactions will continue, creating 
debt, forever. 
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harmonisation may prevail. It is necessary to caveat this discussion: the claims that follow 
about harmonisation are big, and what will be suggested is only a possible direction for 
developments. It is hoped though that this part will provoke debate about the relationship 
between circular economy and harmonisation, especially in the face of multilateral 
technological-managerial developments that will come with moves towards circular 
economy.123  
Harmonisation is a tricky, multifaceted concept.124 We could see harmonisation as 
unification. However, unification may lead to formal doctrinal rules and a prescriptive legal 
regime, limiting participant capacity to avoid or manipulate such rules. There may also be 
difficulties with the creation and maintenance of such rules, with tensions between different 
commercial cultures restricting effective implementation of harmonised regimes.125 The 
history of the property rules in the CISG is a good example of this. Issues more internal to 
different regimes, such as incoherence and unpredictability, both in terms of internal 
assessments of legal regimes and in terms of correlating different jurisdictions, will impact on 
any moves towards harmonisation (or unification).126 Other difficulties may be more in the 
political sphere; recent events such as Brexit, and the Trump Administration’s withdrawal 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate accord, illustrate how political 
debates about sovereignty (however ill-informed) can impact on commerce and trade.127 
There are thus issues concerning identifying the subjects of harmonisation, the process of 
harmonisation, and the mechanism for maintaining harmonised positions (in the event of 
potential future ruptures).128  
These are tough issues, and it may be that there is value in non-harmonisation, in 
difference. Even if we could accept that harmonisation might be a good thing, on balance,129 
we might still never properly resolve the underlying socio-cultural difference that gave rise to 
                                                 
123 On the importance of taking account of technological management in law, see generally R Brownsword, ‘In 
the year 2061: from law to technological management’ (2015) 7 Law, Innovation and Technology 1; R 
Brownsword, ‘Technological Management and the Rule of Law’ (2016) 8 Law, Innovation and Technology 
100; R Brownsword, ‘From Erewhon to AlphaGo: for the sake of human dignity, should we destroy the 
machines’ (2017) 9 Law, Innovation and technology 117. 
124 D Nelken, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies’ in E Örücü and D Nelken (eds), Comparative 
Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 3-42, 31 (making this point in the context of EU 
harmonisation projects). See also generally N Foster, ‘Transmigration and Transferability of Commercial Law 
in a Globalized World’ in A Harding and E Örücü (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer, London 
2002) 55; M Andenas and C B Andersen (eds), Theory and Practice of Harmonisation (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2011); R Goode, ‘Reflections on the Harmonization of Commercial Law’ in R Cranston and R 
Goode (eds), Commercial and Consumer Law: National and International Dimensions (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1993) 3-27, and L F Del Duca, ‘Developing Transnational Harmonization Procedures for the Twenty-
First Century’ in ibid, 28-40; I Fletcher, L Mistelis and M Cremona (eds), Foundations And Perspectives of 
International Trade Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2001). 
125 N H D Foster, ‘Comparative Commercial Law: Rules or Context?’ in Örücü and Nelken, above n 124, 263-
286. 
126 See e.g. J M Smits, ‘Convergence of Private Law in Europe: Towards a New Ius Commune?’ in Örücü and 
Nelken, above n 124, 219-240. 
127 This article makes no specific claims one way or another about Brexit, or Trump. Rather, it merely notes that 
claims as to sovereignty were made by the proponents of such actions. For a valuable analysis of potential 
implications of Brexit on IP, see e.g. G B Dinwoodie and R C Dreyfuss, ‘Brexit and IP: The Great Unraveling?’ 
(30 June 2017) Cardozo Law Review (forthcoming), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996918.  
128 Cf M Siems, Comparative Law (CUP, Cambridge 2014) 233, differentiating “convergence” and 
“harmonisation” on the basis that the latter is ‘based on a deliberate programme for legal unification’. 
129 For some general criticisms on harmonisation, see e.g. L Mistelis, ‘Is harmonisation a necessary evil? The 
future of harmonisation and new sources of international trade law’ in Fletcher, Mistelis and M Cremona, above 
n 124, 1; L Mistelis, ‘Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization, Legal transplants and Law reform – 
Some Fundamental observations’, (2000) 34 International Law 1055. 
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the differences that entailed the question of harmonisation in the first place.130 Furthermore, 
as Nelken perceptively observes, ‘[t]he development of the international economy often uses, 
emphasises or exacerbates differences in the places which produce goods and services even 
as it spreads homogenous appetites for such goods.’131 What this means to the broader 
question of whether circular economy needs legal harmonisation though is unclear, but for 
the sake of clarity it is assumed that there may be something close to legal harmonisation in 
developments towards circular economy.132 Two reasons support this claim. 
On one hand, we could see harmonisation as less about formal unification,133 and more 
about reaching some form of commonality between different legal systems, resembling 
something like the post-war European acquis or ius commune.134 This sort of harmonisation 
results from a combination of political and socio-economic trends.135 Another form of 
harmonisation may result from the globalised nature of circular economy: some form of 
harmony between different legal systems may be practically necessary in order for circular 
economy to work in anything other than jurisdictional autarky.136 The following subsections 
expand on the harmonisation process in commercial context, and will suggest possible 
directions for harmonisation and circular economy. 
4.1 WHAT SORT OF HARMONISATION WOULD BE BEST FOR CIRCULAR ECONOMY? 
Foster has usefully suggested three main (though not exhaustive or exclusive) categories of 
harmonisation processes: ‘institutionally organised; customary, market-based; and pressure to 
conform/inter-jurisdictional competition’.137 The first concerns those efforts such as the 
CISG, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitrational, the Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts, the Model Guide on Secured Transactions. The 
second ‘arises out of international transactions. They are not consciously planned, and a 
                                                 
130 Cf P Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 26 Legal Studies 232; P Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal 
Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111; L Nottage, ‘Convergence, 
Divergence, and the Middle Way in Unifying or Harmonising Private Law’ (2004) 1 Annual of German and 
European Law 166; R Cotterell, ‘Is it so Bad to be Different: Comparative Law and the Appreciation of 
Diversity’ in Örücü and Nelken, above n 124, 133-154. 
131 D Nelken, above n 124, 3-42, 31. 
132 Cf Siems, above n 128, ch 9 generally, and 255-258 in particular, for an overview of the pros and cons of 
what he calls convergence (though for our purposes the arguments apply to harmonisation, if distinguished from 
convergence), with a tendency towards seeing convergence in a positive light. 
133 Cf Mistelis, ‘Is harmonisation a necessary evil?’, above n 127, 4: ‘harmonisation is a process which may 
result in unification of law subject to a number of (often utopian) conditions being fulfilled, such as, for 
example, wide or universal geographical acceptance of harmonisation instruments, and with wide scope of 
harmonising instruments which effectively substitute all pre-existing law.’ 
134 This would include development of the Draft Common Frame of Reference and the Principles of European 
Law, amongst other things. 
135 See e.g. M Gelter, ‘EU Company Law Harmonization Between Convergence and Varieties of Capitalism’ 
(May 30, 2017), in H Wells (ed), Research Handbook on the History of Corporation and Company Law 
(forthcoming), Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2977500, European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 355/2017, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977500 
(suggesting a shift in economic perspectives with the entry of the UK to the then EC in 1972 affected EU 
corporate law). 
136 Foster, above n 124, 56: ‘Commerce is by its nature international, and there is therefore no field in which 
there is more harmonization than commercial law, with numerous transplants … Globalization is itself largely a 
commercial phenomenon.’ 
137 Ibid, 57. Mistelis, n 127, elucidates may varies categorisations of harmonisation. Foster’s is taken here purely 
for clarity. 
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fortiori are not conceived within any institution.’138 The third concerns, broadly, legal 
transplants (of various forms and styles). 
For circular economies, movement towards harmonised aspects of commercial law may 
be required not least because doctrinal similarity will be necessary to prevent off-shoots and 
breakages in circular economic processes as they flit through jurisdictions and across 
boundaries. This can be conceptualised as a tension between focusing on global and local 
perspectives. Cotterrell explains it thus:  
 
I take globalization simply to mean tendencies (however interpreted) towards 
transactional uniformity in economic or social arrangement, institutions and values. 
Localization is taken here to refer to counter-tendencies (of whatever kind) towards 
protection, assertion or facilitation of diversity, difference, independence, separation or 
autonomy of groups, nations or territories, most often in matters of government or 
common values or traditions. … Globalization seems pre-eminently to be about seeking 
similarity by unifying social, economic and often legal arrangements. Localization 
seems to be about appreciating difference by creating, preserving or rediscovering 
conditions in which difference (for example, political or cultural) can flourish and be 
respected.139  
 
Circular economies are cross-jurisdictional, in multiple locations connected through various 
tangible and intangible means across multiple nodes. In order to operate such economies, 
there needs to be mechanisms for long-term and long-distance control, which must 
necessarily cross over any of the potential boundaries to which circular economies are 
potentially susceptible. This is obviously going to be a difficult task, for each of the counter-
tendencies towards localism Cotterrell identified could themselves operate powerful and 
potentially fatal attacks to the unifying effects of harmonisation. However, it is not difficult to 
discern this happening in the field of commercial activity, the stronghold of harmonisation 
activity. 
 Commercial harmonisation efforts have had various degrees of success. This is still 
no such thing as an International Code of Commerce or a worldwide commercial court. 
Moreover, those harmonisation efforts often portrayed as successful are either specific in 
focus (Cape Town Convention), or have well-known exceptions and limitations in scope of 
coverage and substantive content (CISG). Yet as much as there is difficulty extending 
towards full harmonisation, this does not mean lessons cannot be learnt from harmonisation 
efforts about how to deal with the contest between global and local approaches.  
4.2 WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN? 
Cotterrell sets out the urgency in harmonisation efforts: ‘The question is not “whether or 
when?”, but “how and on what model?”’ Comparative law may help in such efforts by 
identifying ‘sources of friction’ and bypassing or eradicating them, ‘by inventively smoothing 
out legal differences, creatively interpreting legal change to those who must accept it, or 
preserving familiar forms, concepts and styles of legal practice and thought while adjusting to 
meet transnational requirements.’140 The implication here is that the effect of harmonisation 
efforts can be tied, loosely or tightly, to the tasks deemed necessary to get around problems in 
                                                 
138 Ibid, 58. 
139 R Cotterrell, ‘Seeking Similarity, Appreciating Difference: Comparative Law and Communities’ in Harding 
and Örücü, above n 124, 35, 43. 
140 Ibid, 45. 
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such processes. It is worth recognising the implication that harmonisation may be the result 
of efforts in preservation of legal doctrine and action. 
The role of industry is also recognised as being an essential element in the success of 
commercial law harmonisation in many other contexts (and conversely, absence of an 
effective industrial voice in the process can have a fatal effect on harmonisation efforts).141 
Cotterrell sets out that 
 
the opening of trade and commerce on an ever wider transnational basis, the 
development of international banking and financial systems, the world-wide control 
and exploitation of intellectual property, the development of the internet, and the 
control of transnational crime of many kinds. All of these projects are seen to require, 
for their efficient pursuit, significant harmonization of nation states, or the creation of 
new transnational regulatory regimes.142  
 
A useful example here is the Cape Town Convention, and the protocol thereto on aircraft 
financing.143 One of the core factors in the success of this Convention is often thought to be 
the role of industry, in particular the aviation industry, as a major driving force.144 A strong 
level of harmonisation amongst elites who operate and maintain a particular regime may 
eradicate underlying cultural differences.145 These elites need not be political elites; 
commercial harmonisation has been driven by self-interested commercial parties and 
organisations. Such commercial bodies have communality of purpose, and act in accordance 
with a broad body of rules and principles (whether formal or otherwise). Without getting into 
the debate about the presence or otherwise of a contemporary (or even historical) lex 
mercatoria, it is simply suggested that commercial actors can be discerned to be acting in 
sufficient concert as to constitute an international commercial culture (or at least, related 
cultures). In this sense, the elites have not so much eradicated underlying cultural differences 
as much as their cultural communality has become the dominant factor.146 This can be seen in 
not just the Cape Town Conventions, but in other agreements whether in the form of treaties 
such as the CISG, or in uniform or model guides such as UNCITRAL’s UPCC, or the Model 
Guides on Secured Transactions. At the end of the scale classic soft-law such as the ICC’s 
UCP on documentary credit also demonstrates a strong cultural communality as between the 
financiers (who basically insist on the UCP) and the users of such action (who readily accept 
it in the event of a letter of credit transaction). 
On the other hand, Smits has suggested that the success of private law harmonisation 
efforts is due partly to the communality in the globalized commercial world as to contracting 
law; this is demonstrated by contra-distinction with the status of property law 
harmonisation.147 For Smits ‘[t]he great difference between contract law and property law 
thus seems to be that the former is much more tied to a non-national environment than the 
latter one’, though with the caveat that there may need to be division between different 
                                                 
141 For example, the lack of enthusiasm from commercial and consumer interests scuttled the proposed Common 
European Sales Law. 
142 Cotterrell, above n 139, 44, citing J Weiner, Globalization and the Harmonization of Law (Pinter, London 
1999). 
143 http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/cape-town-convention. There is a valuable 
bibliography at http://www.unidroit.org/biblio-2001capetown.  
144 M J Sundahl, ‘The Cape Town Approach: A New Method of Making International Law’ (2006) 44 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 339, 349-354. 
145 Foster, above n 125. 
146 Cf Foster, above n 124, 68-69. 
147 J Smits, ‘On Successful Legal Transplants in a Future Ius Commune Euorpaeum’ in Harding and Örücü, 
above n 124, 137, 147. 
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“segments” of contract (say between commercial and consumer contracts).148 It should be 
noted that Smits was concerned with real property. However, we have seen above the effect 
of the differences over personal property rules, and as such we must recognise that element of 
truth implied by Smits’ analysis: the contractual field provides great flexibility for parties to 
manipulate and control their relationships across a wide range, but property law(s) may 
militate against such a tendency due to a more static social position.149  
We can therefore compare the possible trajectory of harmonisation for circular 
economy with that of two other harmonisation projects which are generally deemed 
successful: CISG, and the Cape Town Convention on Mobile Equipment. CISG involved a 
variety of jurisdictions with different social, economic, cultural and other differences. 
Compromises were necessary and the absence of property rules is one of the more obvious 
examples of the exclusionary effects of compromise. For circular economy that is not an 
insurmountable problem. As seen, the shift away from ownership to use will arguably come 
partially as a result of contracting licences as the primary method of disposition, with the 
exacerbating factor of re-characterising retention of title transactions as something other than 
sales, might combined have the effect of showing that circular economy will not be 
concerned with sales transactions as we commonly understand them. This could lead to two 
positions. First, the CISG will not be a suitable umbrella for such transactions, as they are 
both divorced from sale and likely to be too diverse for CISG to be an appropriate 
framework. Second, the potentially limited role for sales might actually mean that those 
transactions that actually are sales (and which may still be necessary in a circular economy) 
may be more appropriately dealt with under the pre-exiting harmonisation scheme offered by 
CISG. Nevertheless, without progress on the status of property in the CISG this suggestion 
must be made with considerable caution. 
For the Cape Town Convention the story is slightly different, and the end result quite 
different. The Cape Town Convention involved a variety of powerful industry interests, 
alongside a stellar academic background, and proceeded to produce a viable and elegant 
system involving an international register of transactions. Despite its success, its applicability 
as a harmonisation project to circular economy is severely limited. The Cape Town 
Convention involved a rather specific type of goods (aircraft),150 whereas circular economies 
will involve vast ranges of goods, notwithstanding the necessary extension to the production 
and disposition sides (covering material inputs and waste products). Registration of interests 
is economically feasible in the context of mobile equipment as per Cape Town, but such an 
approach would be unfeasible for circular economy transactions. This is not to say though 
that no registration is possible. Aspects of the circular economy would not doubt be subject to 
registration, as is already the case with vast swathes of the economy. These registers will 
begin to converge as a result of technological development, rendering the process of 
registration and the storage and use costs of the data more marginal as time progresses. A 
“central” register for all circular economic transactions though is most unlikely. Furthermore, 
licences will not be cost-neutral; there will invariably be negotiations and modifications by 
both parties. The danger is that cost-inducing actions such as negotiating at the outset or 
bargaining for authorisation to modify, will be born by the unequal partner in the 
arrangement, suggesting a likely down-chain transfer of costs. 
Comparing CISG and Cape Town reveals a conceptual issue that any harmonisation 
process will need to engage with. CISG concerned sales. Cape Town concerned secured 
transactions. At the heart of both concepts is the idea of property (even if CISG has taken an 
                                                 
148 Ibid, 148. 
149 Ibid, 150-151. 
150 Other types of goods such as rail stock, were also covered, but it is the aircraft sector which was and remains 
the dominant power here. 
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idiosyncratic approach to property), and in particular at a commercial law, it is about transfers 
of property interests for commercial gain. However, circular economy transactions will 
reflect a move from ownership to use, expressed in a move from proprietorian to personal 
control. This may create problems for the conceptual bases of CISG and Cape Town, with the 
development of new transactional forms that may merge or mutate previous forms. Thus a 
further note of caution must be noted. If there is to be harmonisation in order to achieve 
circular economic goals, it is essential to first ascertain the new sorts of transactional 
relationships that will arise (with attendant issues concerning the commercial/consumer 
relationship). As suggested, the focus will be on the contract aspect of such relationships 
rather than property. Thus the direction harmonisation would likely take, at least at the outset, 
is in harmonisation of contract control mechanisms. However, this claim must be caveated by 
the likely pre-emption of any directed harmonisation processes by means of profusion 
amongst circular economy participants of contract relationships that reflect the urge to have 
cross-jurisdictional control of goods in order to reflect the shift from ownership to use.  
4.3 IS SOMETHING OTHER THAN HARMONISATION MORE APPROPRIATE? 
Hugh Collins has effectively critiqued the potential dangers of transnational private law, 
focusing on its dislocated nature separate from any underlying fixed social grounding.151 
Whilst private law, whether national or transnational, operates from a rather narrow starting 
point, certain types of transnational private law operate from even more narrow foundations. 
This can be compared with domestic private law regimes which take into account broader 
concepts of social justice (including, Collins argues with some success, principles of 
cosmopolitanism). Collins recognised that private law has to deal with some thick concepts of 
social ordering: ‘the rules governing ownership of property, the protection of material and 
personal interests, and the system for governing transactions can be viewed [as] the cement 
that holds the different parts of society together.’152 The effect of this is that transnational 
legal systems might be able to ‘provide a scheme of justice that could be embedded in global 
or regional markets’, and thus might be able to promise ‘secure normative foundations for 
markets that are no longer effectively governed by a nation state’,153 but they fail to do so 
because they either suffer sectoral limitations (in the case of the lex mercatoria systems), or 
because they fail to respond in a sufficiently broad, encompassing and flexible way to 
encompass the social justice embedded within currently domestic private law regimes (this is 
the case of EU private law).154  
 Similar to Collins is Cotterrell’s argument that even if we think of law as being a 
conglomeration of different cultures, meaning ‘[d]ifferent kinds or areas of law relate to 
different types of community’, then there is a danger with overvaluing one particular 
community over another. He raises the issue of an ‘instrumental community as the kind of 
social relationships that are based on common or convergent purposes – especially, but not 
necessarily, economic purposes’, and notes that while harmonisation efforts are often driven 
by perceptions of that community’s status, ‘if law serves it exclusively at the expense of 
protecting and promoting the well-being of other kinds of social bonds, other types of 
                                                 
151 H Collins, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Transnational Private Law’ (2012) 3 ERCL 312. 
152 Ibid, 312. 
153 Ibid, 324. 
154 Ibid, 324-325. Cf Nelken, above n 124, 31: ‘Convergence can also be pursued as part of a deliberate political 
project such as harmonisation of law in the European Union. Because this is something in which comparative 
lawyers play an important part it has led to heated debate about whether harmonisation leads to the sacrifice of 
diversity and whether this is something to be resisted.’ 
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community, it fails to meet some important demands.’155 Although such communities can be 
provided with highly tailored harmonisation efforts, the way they serve ‘social groups 
(especially commercial enterprises, trade networks and economic interest groups) that mutate 
rapidly as national and international markets alter.’156 
Circular economy may suffer similar difficulties. On one hand, there may be sectoral 
limitations if circular economic practice is unable to extend beyond sub-specific examples; it 
will need to be able to provide “whole-regime” responses to issues concerning all types of 
private law concepts. Potentially more fatal to circular economic practice might be the 
difficulties arising from the almost paradigmatic shifts that will occur in terms of how 
transactions occur and what the effect of such transactions will be, in order to support long-
term down-chain control, necessary for effective implementation of circular economic 
practices. This will probably lead to some form of political contestation, and this can be seen 
in the context of the EU-centric nature of some circular economic thought.157  
We must be wary of the fact that ‘[l]egal cultures are thus overlapping and inter-
related and may come together in unexpected ways. The method of law-making by Directive 
of the Commission of the European Union is closer to civil than it is to common law 
tradition, but much of the substance of such laws has to with common law influenced ideas of 
liberalism and the free market.’158 Regardless of the complexities arising from Brexit, the 
point to be taken from Nelken’s analysis is that normative and formative issues concerning 
law and society may combine in interesting ways. The circular economy necessarily raises 
such issues of combination, and thus engagement with the possible ways of encompassing 
circular economy as cross-border society raises the need for a new form of governance that 
can be respond to an era of technologically-enforced hyper-globalisation and confusing and 
often reactionary behaviour by states and corporations. 
 Mere harmonisation or unification of doctrine will not suffice. The very act of 
harmonisation/unification has been subject to so much critique from a theoretical perspective, 
and can be demonstrated as giving rise to far too many problems at all stages (proposal, 
application, maintenance), that it arguably is not worth attempting in any situations more 
complex than those that focus on a very narrow sector operated by and for particular elite 
participants (such as that found with the Cape Town Convention). The circular economy 
necessarily encompasses too broad a range of stuff, and will involve multiple different 
participants causing a potentially complex debate over the content of any harmonising 
instrument. 
 Where there may be successful harmonisation (or harmonisation-like activity) may be 
at the very soft end of the spectrum. This is likely to occur in the context of enhanced 
attention being paid to the content and structure of contracts for the use of goods at different 
points along the circular economy. There are a number of benefits of such an approach, 
particularly for commercial organisations. First, the retreat to contract is a retreat to a point of 
accepted safety: party autonomy is such a strong principle within the intellectual framework 
of international commercial law (and, importantly, amongst international commercial 
lawyers) that challenges are usually unsuccessful. By going to contract, and claiming the 
principle of party autonomy, commercial entities will essentially have a rhetorical trump card 
which may have a blinding effect on practitioners, legislators, regulators and academics.159 
Second, the shift from ownership to use, within the ideology and foundational normative 
work on the circular economy, can be analogised with the recent developments in English 
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law with regard to the effect of retention of title clauses. In such cases, there is no contract of 
sale. The proprietary element of the transaction is that which takes it out of the SGA 
framework, which in turn necessarily increases the importance of the contractual framework 
of the specific agreement(s). Moreover, the shift away from ownership, which is a shift away 
from sale, means that there is unlikely to be harmonisation with CISG in the context of a 
response to circular economy. Third, the move to contractual control will provide bargaining 
power to those with the strongest negotiating position; this is likely to be commercial 
organisations. This raises obviously tough questions in terms of the status of consumers in 
circular economies, but it would be wrong to ignore the point that commercial inequality can 
be just as great. Furthermore, the advantage of being an initiator in circular economic 
transactions is that one has the power to control later transactions. Since there will invariably 
be a number of down-chain transactions, notwithstanding any interactions with other circular 
economies (due to the complexity of modern globalised commercial practices), the reification 
of contractual control will provide those parties capable of negotiating and modify their 
contracts with especially valuable power. The benefits suggest that non-formal 
harmonisation, with contracts (and contracting practices) functioning as operative 
harmonizing instruments in a soft-law context, will be acceptable for certain commercial 
parties. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Circular economic ideas are relatively novel; commercial practices instigating such ideas are 
even newer. Legal analysis of circular economies is lagging behind in the broad literature. 
Here it is been suggested that one of the core underlying shifts engendered by circular 
economy is a move away from “ownership” to “use” as governing practices for commercial 
engagement with goods. One of the results of this will be a reconceptualization of the notion 
of sale: transaction chains will transmogrify into circles, with “initiators” (rather than 
“sellers”) beginning the process and controlling the objects’ journey around the circular 
economy and capturing and recalling back any waste products that do break out of the circle. 
This in turn presents a number of challenges for commercial law, in particular the purpose 
and nature of property and title ideas that have stood the test of time as central foundations of 
the English commercial law. Recent case-law on retention of title clauses indicates a break 
between such clauses and the sales regime; such agreements can be considered sui generis 
providing the parties retaining title with a wider array of potential remedies against 
recalcitrant purchasers. The full implications of the Bunkers case are yet to be seen, but that 
case arguably enhances the role of the contract and the use of the goods, rather than the 
ownership and the property in/of the goods. By accepting that it is not a zero-sum game and 
that one can both retain title and not have a sales transaction, the door is open for licences to 
use goods to burst through. Initiators can retain title, which can then be used as an additional 
protection focusing on the value of the transaction, whilst maintaining that the contract with 
the first acquirer is a non-sale contract. This would help to avoid some of the potential traps 
arising from the section 12 obligations. Furthermore, by taking advantage of the role licences 
could play, especially as they can control more sub-acquirers in more subtle and more 
complex ways, initiators can increase the chances of their control of far greater proportions of 
the circular transactions. Contracts with the power of property – contracts which extend their 
reach through multiple participants – will not only happen due to the nature of free market 
bargaining (within obvious limitations), but because of the necessity of accepting loss of 
control for participation (other than as an initiator) within a circular economy. 
 Law and circular economy are already in an unknowing, unwitting relationship. 
Regulatory frameworks exist, even if they are lacking in detail and substance. More 
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importantly, commercial practices on circular economic lines are already evident and 
occurring; small suggestions as to potentially large fissures in the law have already been 
made. Most importantly, circular economic thought is attracting interest from various 
commercial and corporate lobby and interest groups. Drawing on the environmental benefits 
(however speculative) will no doubt help the commercial side gel with the NGO participants 
in this debate. It is therefore possible that law and circular economy will come together, but 
this will require us to rethink our understanding of the practices of commercial transactions. 
